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Abstract 
This paper investigates the factors influencing airline’s costs for climate protecting market-based measures. It is based on 
selected results of the interdisciplinary research project AviClim (Including Aviation in International Protocols for Climate 
Protection). AviClim has investigated how to limit aviation’s full climate impact best from an environmental and economic point 
of view. In this research project, both long-lived CO2 and short-lived non-CO2 effects of aviation have been addressed 
simultaneously and climate protecting scenarios for aviation in the timeframe 2010-2030 have been developed. On this basis, the 
factors determining aviation’s costs for climate protecting measures have been analysed. 
 
Results indicate that the choice of the market-based measure, it’s regional scope, the metric chosen for the translation of the non-
CO2 impacts into equivalent CO2 and the prices for equivalent CO2 are important factors for airline’s costs. An analysis for single 
flights reveals remarkable differences in specific emissions (tons CO2 equivalent/flight kilometre). An investigation for groups of 
airlines differentiated by business model and country of origin indicates that the world regions served by the airlines, the business 
model, the length and the emission characteristics of the flights are further important factors for the costs of the regulating 
measure. 
 
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of WORLD CONFERENCE ON TRANSPORT RESEARCH SOCIETY. 
Keywords: air transport; climate relevant emissions; market-based measures 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +49 2203 601 2187; fax: +49 2203 601 2377. 
E-mail address: Janina.Scheelhaase@dlr.de 
 Author name / Transportation Research Procedia 00 (2017) 000–000 2 
1. Objectives 
Aviation is a continuously growing sector. According to forecasts of the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
ICAO, international aviation is expected to grow by 3 – 5 per cent annually in the next decades, depending on the 
world region (ICAO, 2013). As aviation’s climate relevant emissions are only regulated to a small part currently, air 
transport’s contribution to climate change will be increasing in the next decades. Aviation generates both long 
lasting effects on climate by emitting CO2 and rather short term effects by emitting NOx, H2O, contrails and contrail 
cirrus which induce ozone and methane changes. While CO2 has an atmospheric lifetime up to a millennia, the 
lifetime of the other climate relevant species ranges from hours to months respectively decades. Different to most 
sectors, aviation’s non-CO2 effects on climate play an important role and contribute about 2/3 of the total impact on 
climate in terms of radiative forcing (Lee et al., 2009). 
 
The interdisciplinary research project AviClim (Including Aviation in International Protocols for Climate Protection) 
has explored the feasibility for including aviation’s full climate impact, i.e., both long-lived CO2 and short-lived 
non-CO2 effects, in international protocols for climate protection and has investigated the economic impacts. In 
particular, the cost, demand, competition and employment as well as the environmental effects have been analyzed. 
For regulating aviation’s full climate impact, three different market-based measures have been designed. The present 
paper presents selected results of the project and investigates the factors determining aviation’s costs for climate 
protecting measures. 
 
 
2. Data and methodology 
Climate relevant species addressed within AviClim are: CO2, NOx, H2O and contrails. This way, the full climate 
impact of aviation can be regulated at the same time. In this research project, a climate tax, an open emission trading 
scheme for regulating all climate relevant emissions from aviation and a NOx emission charge combined with an 
open CO2 trading scheme and operational measures have been investigated alternatively for the regulation of 
aviation’s full climate impact. These market-based measures have been combined with four geopolitical reduction 
scenarios which differ concerning the international support for these climate protecting measures. In this way, they 
take the global dimension of the issue and the challenges associated with the international negotiations on climate 
change into account. Based on the political discussions on EU-, ICAO- and UNFCCC-level in the last years, four 
scenarios have been considered: 
• The first geopolitical scenario assumes that the political measure under consideration will be implemented 
by the Member States of the European Union (EU27) plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, but not by 
the rest of the world. This scenario is called “Greater EU”. 
• A second scenario which presumes that the US, Canada, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Russia, Australia, 
India, China, Brazil and the United Arab Emirates will introduce this political measure in addition to the 
“Greater EU”-States (EU27, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland). This way, the major players 
and emitters in international aviation will be addressed. Accordingly, this scenario is called “Great Aviation 
Countries”. 
• A third geopolitical scenario assumes that all Annex-I Countries of the Kyoto Protocol plus Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (BRIC-Countries) but none of the other developing countries will implement the climate 
protecting measure under consideration. This scenario has been named “Annex-I Countries”. 
• Finally, the scenario “World” is assuming a worldwide implementation of the climate protecting measure 
under consideration. 
 
As a reference development, a business-as-usual scenario has been developed. In this scenario, the absence of 
climate protecting measures in aviation other than implemented until 2010, is assumed.  
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The three market-based measures have been combined with the four geopolitical reduction scenarios. The 
comparison of the environmental and economic impacts of these different market-based measures and geopolitical 
scenarios allows for conclusions on the environmental, economic and competitive impacts of the political measures 
under consideration. 
 
The cost, demand and competition impacts of these political measures as well as the impacts on employment have 
been estimated by employing economic simulation models. The environmental and climate effects have been 
investigated by DLR-developed metrics and models, see Schaefer (2012) and Dahlmann (2012) as well as 
Scheelhaase et al. (2015) for details.  
 
Both long-lived CO2 and short-lived non-CO2 species, such as NOX, H2O or contrails and associated cirrus, 
contribute to aviation’s full climate impact. The latter depend on flight altitude, geographical location, day time, 
weather and other factors (e. g. Fichter et al. (2005), Mannstein et al. (2005), Fichter (2009) and Frömming et al. 
(2012)). Since the life-times of non-CO2 species differ and their climate impact depends to a great extent on the 
location of emission, the climate impact induced by aviation’s non-CO2 species is not proportional to the CO2 
emissions. Against this background, the application of a suitable metric is important for the appropriate translation of 
the non-CO2 effects into equivalent CO2. According to Dahlmann (2012), the so-called ‘Average Temperature 
Response’ (atr) is an adequate metric for the comparison of aviation’s non-CO2 effects with each other and with CO2 
and the translation of the non-CO2 effects into equivalent CO2. Within AviClim, time horizons for the metric atr of 
20 and 50 years (atr 20 and atr 50) are investigated. This means the mean changes in near surface temperature 
averaged over 20 and 50 years, respectively, are taken into account. In this paper, we concentrate on the effects 
calculated for the metric atr 50. 
 
Within AviClim, three different price development paths for CO2 and CO2 equivalents have been assumed 
alternatively: 
• A ‘High Price Path’ where prices per ton CO2 equivalent range from 10 USD in the year 2010 up to 80 
USD in the year 2030, 
• a ‘Low Price Path’ where a price development of 10 USD per ton CO2 equivalent (2010) to 30 USD 
per ton in 2030 has been assumed and 
• a ‘Mixed Price Path’. This price path combines low CO2 equivalent prices for both trading schemes 
under investigation and high CO2 equivalent prices for the climate tax and the NOX charge. This way, 
the probable advantages of emission trading models which become evident in lower prices for emission 
permits (as compared to taxes and charges) can be shown more explicitly. 
 
The costs for the market-based measures will increase the production costs of the airlines under the regulatory 
scheme. Under the simplifying assumption that the airlines will act as profit maximizers, they will try to pass-
through the full costs of complying with the regulation scheme. Accordingly, prices for air services will increase. 
How will demand react? As it is difficult to predict this demand reaction (see Oum et al. (1990), Oum et al. (1992) or 
Lu (2009), for instance), different price elasticities of demand have been assumed alternatively. The corresponding 
demand reactions range from an inelastic reaction (quantitative demand for air services remains unchanged as 
compared to the business-as-usual development); a moderate demand reduction (quantitative demand reduction is 
under proportionate to the price increase); and a highly elastic reaction (quantitative demand reduction is 
disproportionate to the price increase by the airlines). 
 
In case demand reacts to the price increase by a quantitative reduction in demand, airlines’ revenues will be affected 
negatively. As a next step, the airlines are expected to change their flight plan (supply side effect). Implicitly, 
equality of supply and demand has been assumed here. This is plausible after a certain time. These developments 
will affect employment and air traffic in the timeframe analysed. In case air traffic will decrease as compared to the 
business-as-usual development, a reduction in fuel consumption, climate relevant emissions and a reduced climate 
impact from aviation result.  
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3. Results 
The following section provides an overview of AviClim’s selected results on the costs and competition impacts of 
the market-based measures climate tax and emission trading for all climate relevant species. Here, modelling results 
for the geopolitical scenarios “Greater EU”, “Great Aviation Countries” and “World” combined with the “High 
Price Path” as well as the “Low Price Path” and the metric atr 50 are presented. This selection of market-based 
measures and scenarios allows for most meaningful results in terms of cost and competitive impacts. Scheelhaase et 
al. (2014) presents and discusses AviClim’s economic and environmental results in full. 
 
In the next section at first cost impacts for the aviation sector under the respective market-based measure are 
presented. This is followed by an analysis of the cost and competition impacts on airlines’ level. 
 
 
3.1 Costs for the airlines under the market-based measure 
 
Under the assumption that the airlines potential to abate climate relevant emissions by technological measures will 
be already tapped in the business-as-usual scenario, which is reasonable to believe as fuel costs are an important 
driver today, the costs for the market-based measures will increase the production costs of the airline sector, as 
mentioned above. AviClim results show that total costs for the airline sector depend to a great extent on the market-
based measure, the geopolitical reduction scenario and the CO2 equivalent prices assumed. The following pictures 
provide an overview of the costs modelled for the airlines under the respective market-based measure and 
geopolitical scenario. 
 
 
Pictures 1 and 2: Cost impacts in the scenarios “Greater EU” (left picture) and “Great Aviation Countries” (right picture) in USD   
million, Low Price Path. Source: AviClim modelling results. In 2012 prices. Results for the metric atr 50. 
 
 
Picture 3: Cost impacts in the scenario “World”, in USD million,  
High Price Path. Source: AviClim modelling results. In 2012 prices.   
Results for the metric atr 50. 
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As the pictures show total costs for complying with the respective market-based measure increase within the 
timeframe analysed. This development can be explained by the expected air traffic growth in 2010 – 2030. This 
leads to rising climate relevant emissions and increasing costs for the climate tax and the emission trading scheme. 
 
With regard to the geopolitical reduction scenario investigated total costs are the highest for the scenario “World”. 
As a maximum, total costs of about 339 USD million can be expected in the year 2030 (climate tax, High Price 
Path). Costs calculated for the “Great Aviation Countries” are almost at the level of the results for the “World” 
scenario. This is because the delta between both reduction schemes is less than 10 per cent of the global flights. In 
contrast, costs estimated for the airlines under the “Greater EU” scenario are comparably low. Here costs ranging 
from 1 USD billion (emission trading, Low Price Path) in the year 2010 to 105 USD billion (climate tax, High Price 
Path) in the year 2030 have been modelled. Overall, these differences in costs are caused by the number and the 
emission characteristics of the flights under the respective geopolitical reduction scenario.  
 
An analysis of the market-based measure assumed reveals that the emission trading scheme for all climate relevant 
species causes significantly lower costs than the climate tax. This is the case for all geopolitical scenarios and price 
paths investigated. The differences in costs are the highest in the beginning of the time period under investigation 
and diminish partly until 2030. In the “Greater EU” scenario, for example, total costs for the emission trading 
scheme amount up to 1 USD billion in 2010 while costs for the climate tax are expected to be about 7 USD billion 
in that year (High Price Path). In the year 2030, however, total costs for complying with the emission trading 
scheme are expected to be about 57 USD billion and total costs for the climate tax are estimated at 105 USD billion 
(High Price Path). These differences between the market-based measures can be explained by their fundamental 
discrepancies in the modes of functioning: While the climate tax charges from the first unit of CO2 equivalent, under 
an emission trading scheme 85 per cent of 2010’s emissions are free of charge because for this amount emission 
permits are allocated for free. Consequently, at the beginning of the timeframe under consideration a relatively small 
number of permits has to be purchased additionally. This leads to smaller costs as compared to the climate tax. In 
the course of time the number of required permits rises as air traffic is expected to grow. As a result costs for 
complying with the emission trading scheme for the airline sector increase until 2030 but stay on a lower level than 
the costs for the climate tax. Overall, AviClim modelling results indicate that a global emission trading scheme 
limiting aviation’s full climate impact would be advantageous to minimise airlines’ costs as compared to a climate 
tax. 
 
At the same time, environmental benefits from the emissions trading scheme are significant: For the scenario 
“World”, for instance, a reduction in temperature change of up to about 70 per cent in the year 2100 has been 
estimated as compared to a business-as-usual development. See Scheelhaase et al. (2014) and Scheelhaase et al. 
(2015) for full environmental results. 
 
3.2 Costs and competitive impacts for airline groups under the market-based measure 
 
As total costs probably will be distributed differently within the airline sector, competitive distortions may be caused 
by the climate protecting measures. To investigate these questions, different airline groups were created which have 
been formed in respect to the country of origin and the business model of the airlines under consideration. 
 
1. Geopolitical Scenario “Greater EU”: 
• Top 10 “Greater EU” Full Service Network Carrier (FSNC); 
• Top 10 Non-“Greater EU” Full Service Network Carrier (FSNC); 
• Top 10 “Greater EU” Low Cost Carrier (LCC)/Holiday carrier. 
2. Geopolitical Scenario “Great Aviation Countries”: 
• Top 10 “Great Aviation Countries” Full Service Network Carrier (FSNC); 
• Top 10 Non-“ Great Aviation Countries” Full Service Network Carrier (FSNC); 
• Top 10 “Great Aviation Countries” Low Cost Carrier (LCC)/Holiday carrier. 
3. Geopolitical Scenario “World”: 
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• Top 10 “World” Full Service Network Carrier (FSNC); 
• Top 10 “World” Low Cost Carrier (LCC)/Holiday carrier. 
 
This grouping was conducted for two reasons: Firstly, an analysis on individual companies’ level would be 
associated with too many uncertainties since management strategies and market developments play an important 
role on this level, which are difficult to foresee for external parties. Secondly, an investigation of the total some 250 
airlines listed in the global flight schedule OAG (Official Airline Guide (2011 ff.)) would be too time-consuming 
and probably not lead to very meaningful results as the assignment of the individual airlines to the different airline 
business models will be questionable in a number of cases.  
 
Regional carriers have been excluded from this analysis because in most cases, these airlines can be characterized as 
being not very important in terms of ASK (available ton kilometres) offered, RTK (revenue ton kilometres) operated 
as well as revenues realized and distances operated as compared to the rest of the sector. Also, regional carriers 
operate their flights mostly within national or close continental boundaries. Against this background distinctive 
results from a comparison of the economic effects for these groups of airlines cannot be expected.  
 
The following tables provide an overview of the assignment of individual airlines to the respective airline groups 
explained above, differentiated by geopolitical reduction scenario. This assignment has been conducted on the bases 
of empirical passenger data (RPK) for the year 2010 (Airline Business (2011)). This base year had to be chosen 
because all models used within AviClim’s base upon this year. In this respect, the ranking of the different Top 10 
airlines groups is not up to date anymore in some cases. And some of the airlines listed in the following table do not 
exist as individual companies anymore today. For instance, Continental Airlines and United Airlines merged in 
2010/2011 and the brand ‘Continental’ has been abandoned since. On the other hand, an in-depth analysis of the 
rankings 2009-2013 reveals that the changes in ranking pre-dominantly rest upon position changes within the ‘Top 
10 groups’ or company mergers. Against this background the respective Top 10 airlines groups can be characterized 
as being relatively stable in the timeframe 2009-2013. 
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Table 1: Geopolitical reduction scenario “Greater EU”: airline groups investigated 
Top 10 “Greater EU”- Full Service 
Network Carrier  
Top 10 Non-“Greater EU”- Full Service 
Network Carrier 
Top 10 “Greater EU”- Low Cost Carrier/ 
Holiday Carrier 
Lufthansa, Air France, British 
Airways, KLM, Iberia, Virgin Atlantic 
Airways, Alitalia, TAP Portugal, 
Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) and 
Finnair. 
Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, 
United Airlines, Emirates, Continental 
Airlines, China Southern Airlines, 
Qantas, Cathay Pacific, US Airways  
and Air China. 
Ryanair, easyjet, Air Berlin, Thomson 
Airways, Thomas Cook Airways (UK), 
Condor Flugdienst, Air Europa, TUIfly, 
Monarch Airlines and Aer Lingus. 
Source: Own compilation on the basis of Airline Business (2011). Airline assignment on the basis of the country of origin and main business 
model used. Only airlines with flights under the reduction scheme are taken into account. 
 
Table 2: Geopolitical reduction scenario “Great Aviation Countries”: airline groups investigated 
Top 10 “Great Aviation Countries” - 
Full Service Network Carrier  
Top 10 Non-“Great Aviation Countries”- 
Full Service Network Carrier 
Top 10 “Great Aviation Countries”- Low 
Cost Carrier/Holiday Carrier 
Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, 
United Airlines, Emirates, Lufthansa, 
Continental Airlines, Air France, China 
Southern Airlines, British Airways and 
Qantas.  
Thai Airways International, Qatar 
Airways, Turkish Airlines (THY), Malay-
sia Airlines, Saudi Arabian Airlines, 
LAN Airlines, China Airlines, Air New 
Zealand, South African Airways and 
Garuda Indonesia Airways. 
Southwest Airlines, Ryanair, easyjet, Jet-
Blue Airways (US), Air Berlin, Thomson 
Airways, AirTran Airways, GOL Linhas 
Aereas Inteligentes, Thomas Cook 
Airlines (UK) and WestJet Airlines 
(Canada). 
Source: Own compilation on the basis of Airline Business (2011). Airline assignment on the basis of the country of origin and main business 
model used. Only airlines with flights under the reduction scheme are taken into account. 
 
Table 3: Geopolitical reduction scenario “World”: airline   
groups investigated 
Top 10 “World” - Full Service Net-
work Carrier  
Top 10 “World”- Low Cost Carrier/ 
Holiday Carrier 
Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, 
United Airlines, Emirates, Lufthansa, 
Continental Airlines, Air France, China 
Southern Airlines, British Airways and 
Qantas.  
Southwest Airlines, Ryanair, easyjet, 
JetBlue Airways (US), Air Berlin, 
Thomson Airways, AirTran Airways, 
GOL Linhas Aereas Inteligentes, Thomas 
Cook Airlines (UK) and WestJet Airlines 
(Canada). 
Source: Own compilation on the basis of Airline Business (2011). Airline assignment on the   
basis main business model used. 
 
Not surprisingly, the Top 10 groups of the FSNC as well as the LCC/Holiday carrier in the scenarios “Great 
Aviation Countries” and “World” are identical in ranking and composition, as the last two tables illustrate. An in-
depth analyses and comparison of the competitive impacts for the airlines groups under both reduction scenarios is 
still worthwhile conducting because in the “World” scenario all global flights are subject to the respective market-
based measure whereas in the scenario “Great Aviation Countries” only the flights to, from and within these 
countries are under the respective reduction instrument. 
 
The modelling of the cost impacts of the climate tax and the emission trading scheme for all climate relevant species 
from aviation has been conducted as follows: At first, the revenue ton kilometres (RTK) of the years 2010-2030 
under the respective geopolitical reduction scenario have been calculated for the individual airlines. According to 
AviClim’s main assumptions, all flights to, from and within the countries participating in the geopolitical scenario 
are subject to the market-based measure under consideration. At second, the corresponding climate relevant 
emissions (in tons CO2, NOX, H2O, contrails) for these flights have been estimated.  
 
The costs for the climate tax have then been modelled by weighing the climate relevant emissions under the 
reduction scenario on the airlines level with the specific metric for CO2, NOX, H2O, contrails, respectively. The 
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metric atr50 translates the climate impact of the non-CO2 species into equivalent CO2. This metric varies with the 
flight position p (see below) and the climate relevant species. This way, the different climate relevant species can be 
directly compared with each other and the total amount added up in tons CO2 equivalent. As a next step, the total 
amount of CO2 equivalent subject to the reduction measure has been multiplied by the assumed price per ton CO2 
equivalent, differentiated by the three price scenarios and years explained above.  
 
These modelling steps can be conducted by using the following formula 
 
 
 
Where: NOX (p) is the amount of NOX emitted on the different flight altitudes, degrees of longitudes and latitudes 
(identical with flight position p) at different points in time. The climate relevant species H2O, CO2 and contrails are 
differentiated by the flight position p as well, because these species diversify with the local atmospheric conditions 
and the actual thrust-setting of the engines. Since the climate impact of CO2 does not depend on the altitude of 
emission, it is not necessary to take the flight altitude (atrCO2,p) into account for this climate relevant species.  
 
The climate tax has been calculated for all flights and airlines under the respective reduction scenario on a flight-by-
flight-basis. The summation of the individual airlines’ costs for the Top 10 airline groups analysed equates to their 
total costs for the climate tax. 
 
The costs for complying with the emission trading scheme have been calculated within three consecutive steps: 
Starting point was the estimation of the emissions cap for the respective geopolitical reduction scenario. Within 
AviClim the emissions cap has been set at 2010 levels. This means that aviation’s emissions are limited to the 
amount of CO2 equivalent emitted in the year 2010. This cap has been calculated in tons of CO2 equivalent applying 
the methodology explained above. For all emissions exceeding this cap, permits have to be purchased by the 
airlines. Since the aviation sector is expected to grow in the timeframe 2010-2030, aviation will be a net buyer on 
the emission permits market. Furthermore a free allocation of 85% of 2010 emissions has been assumed, this 
assumption has been inspired by the free allocation rule in the EU-ETS. The remaining 15% of permits have to be 
auctioned by the airlines. Applying these rules, the amount of climate relevant species under the emission trading 
scheme and the amount of emissions exceeding the cap can be calculated. For the latter, emission permits have to be 
purchased. The amount of permits allocated free of charge to the individual airlines will be determined by a so-
called benchmark, which has also been inspired by the related regulations in the EU-ETS for aviation. But within 
AviClim, we decided to abstain from introducing the numerous exceptions within the EU-ETS and to keep the 
benchmark rules relatively simple. The benchmark applied within AviClim stays constant throughout the whole 
timeframe analysed, same as the EU-ETS. But it differs between the geopolitical scenarios because the absolute 
amount of CO2 equivalent emitted as well as the revenue ton kilometres (RTK) subject to the reduction schemes 
vary. 
 
The method of calculating the benchmark for aviation has been described in literature, for instance see Scheelhaase 
et al. (2010) for details. In short, the total amount of CO2 equivalent of the base year (AviClim: 2010) is weighed 
with the share of emission permits allocated for free (AviClim: 85%). The result will then be calculated as a ratio of 
the total revenue ton kilometres (RTK) of the year 2010. This benchmark in turn will be multiplied by the absolute 
number of RTK submitted by the airline for the year 2010 to calculate the individual amount of permits allocated 
free of charge. This way, very environmental efficient airlines will get a higher amount of emission permits for free 
while relatively inefficient aircraft operators will receive a smaller number of permits per RTK. Thus, early movers 
in terms of efficiency will be rewarded for their past steps. 
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The benchmark applied within AviClim can be regarded as a measurement for the environmental efficiency of the 
flights under the reduction scheme. In the geopolitical “Greater EU” scenario the benchmark is 2.817 tons CO2 
equivalent/1,000 RTK, in scenario “Great Aviation Countries” it is 2.940 tons CO2 equivalent/1,000 RTK and in 
scenario “World” it is 2.952 tons CO2 equivalent/1,000 RTK. Here, the existing differences in the environmental 
efficiency of flights and airlines already show. Apparently the flights to, from and within the countries of the 
“Greater EU” scenario in the year 2010 are a little more environmental efficient than the other flights analysed here. 
Whether this can be explained by the environmental efficiency of the airlines or the specific characteristics of the 
flights under the regulation scheme will be investigated in the following.  
 
The cost impact of the emission trading scheme on the individual airlines can be calculated by subtracting the 
number of permits allocated free of charge from the absolute amount of CO2 equivalent emitted. The delta is the 
number of permits which has to be purchased on the emission permits market. This delta will be multiplied with the 
assumed price for CO2 equivalent. The costs for complying with the emission trading scheme on the level of 
individual airlines result. The summation of the costs of the respective Top 10 groups equates to their total costs for 
this market-based measure.  
 
The following tables provide an overview of the costs calculated for the different airline groups, market-based 
measures, geopolitical reduction scenarios and price paths explained above.  
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Table 4: Absolute costs for the climate tax and the emission trading scheme for different airline groups, in USD million 
Scenario/Group of Airlines Low Price Path High Price Path 
Emission Trading all species 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Top 10 "Greater EU" Network Carrier  399 1696 3677 6513 8753 399 2827 7354 15631 23342 
Top 10 Non-"Greater EU" Network Carrier 152 669 1451 2378 3647 152 1116 2902 5707 9727 
Top 10 "Greater EU" LCC/Holiday Carrier 141 487 1001 1526 2193 141 811 2002 3662 5849 
           Top 10 "Great Aviation Countries" Network Carrier 1040 3363 7753 12835 19600 1040 5605 15506 30803 52267 
Top 10 Non-"Great Aviation Countries" Network Carrier 155 816 1862 3143 4777 155 1360 3723 7544 12739 
Top 10 "Great Aviation Countries" LCC/Holiday Carrier 242 819 1631 2481 3578 242 1365 3261 5955 9540 
           Top 10 "World" Network Carrier 982 4158 8892 14342 21533 982 6930 17784 34420 57420 
Top 10 "World" LCC/Holiday Carrier 249 843 1680 2145 3693 249 1406 3360 4487 9847 
           Scenario/Group of Airlines Low Price Path High Price Path 
Climate Tax 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Top 10 "Greater EU" Network Carrier  2658 5085 8195 12160 15530 2658 8474 16390 29184 41414 
Top 10 Non-"Greater EU" Network Carrier 1013 1960 3173 4530 6230 1013 3267 6345 10871 16612 
Top 10 "Greater EU" LCC/Holiday Carrier 938 1682 2595 3518 4584 938 2804 5190 8444 12224 
           Top 10 "Great Aviation Countries" Network Carrier 6934 12204 19541 27569 37282 6934 20340 39082 66167 99419 
Top 10 Non-"Great Aviation Countries" Network Carrier 1036 2137 3622 5344 7418 1036 3561 7245 12826 19782 
Top 10 "Great Aviation Countries" LCC/Holiday Carrier 1613 2875 4372 5908 7690 1613 4792 8745 14180 20507 
           Top 10 "World" Network Carrier 6546 10683 20020 28252 38225 6546 17805 40040 67804 101933 
Top 10 "World" LCC/Holiday Carrier 1661 2962 4504 5160 7929 1661 4936 9008 10896 21145 
Source: AviClim modelling results. In 2012 prices. Results for metric atr 50. 
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Table 5: Specific costs for the climate tax and the emission trading scheme for different airline groups, in USD/RTK 
Scenario/Group of Airlines Low Price Path High Price Path 
Emission Trading all species 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Top 10 "Greater EU" Network Carrier  0.005 0.016 0.028 0.041 0.045 0.005 0.027 0.056 0.098 0.120 
Top 10 Non-"Greater EU" Network Carrier 0.005 0.017 0.029 0.037 0.046 0.005 0.028 0.057 0.090 0.122 
Top 10 "Greater EU" LCC/Holiday Carrier 0.005 0.015 0.026 0.034 0.042 0.005 0.026 0.052 0.081 0.111 
           Top 10 "Great Aviation Countries" Network Carrier 0.006 0.015 0.027 0.038 0.045 0.006 0.024 0.053 0.091 0.119 
Top 10 Non-"Great Aviation Countries" Network Carrier 0.005 0.018 0.032 0.042 0.050 0.005 0.030 0.063 0.100 0.134 
Top 10 "Great Aviation Countries" LCC/Holiday Carrier 0.006 0.017 0.028 0.036 0.045 0.006 0.028 0.056 0.087 0.120 
           Top 10 "World" Network Carrier 0.005 0.018 0.030 0.040 0.049 0.005 0.030 0.061 0.096 0.130 
Top 10 "World" LCC/Holiday Carrier 0.006 0.017 0.029 0.032 0.046 0.006 0.029 0.057 0.066 0.122 
Average 0.005 0.017 0.029 0.037 0.046 0.005 0.028 0.057 0.089 0.122 
Scenario/Group of Airlines Low Price Path High Price Path 
Climate Tax 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Top 10 "Greater EU" Network Carrier  0.032 0.049 0.063 0.077 0.080 0.032 0.081 0.126 0.184 0.213 
Top 10 Non-"Greater EU" Network Carrier 0.033 0.049 0.061 0.071 0.078 0.033 0.082 0.125 0.171 0.209 
Top 10 "Greater EU" LCC/Holiday Carrier 0.036 0.053 0.068 0.078 0.087 0.036 0.088 0.136 0.187 0.232 
           Top 10 "Great Aviation Countries" Network Carrier 0.039 0.053 0.067 0.081 0.085 0.039 0.088 0.134 0.196 0.226 
Top 10 Non-"Great Aviation Countries" Network Carrier 0.030 0.047 0.061 0.071 0.078 0.030 0.078 0.123 0.171 0.208 
Top 10 "Great Aviation Countries" LCC/Holiday Carrier 0.041 0.059 0.075 0.086 0.096 0.041 0.098 0.150 0.207 0.257 
           Top 10 "World" Network Carrier 0.036 0.046 0.068 0.078 0.086 0.036 0.076 0.137 0.188 0.230 
Top 10 "World" LCC/Holiday Carrier 0.042 0.061 0.077 0.076 0.098 0.042 0.101 0.154 0.160 0.262 
Average 0.036 0.052 0.068 0.077 0.086 0.036 0.087 0.136 0.183 0.230 
Source: AviClim modelling results. In 2012 prices. Results for metric atr 50.
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The tables show that both the absolute cost impact and the specific costs implied by the climate protecting measure 
differ quite clearly from each other with regard to the geopolitical reduction scenarios analyzed. In absolute numbers 
the highest cost impact can be expected for airlines based in one of the countries supporting the respective climate 
protecting measure. The climate tax, for instance, will lead to additional costs for the Top 10 FSNC from a “Greater 
EU”-Country of about 15.53 USD billion in the year 2030 (Low Price Scenario). Their competitors from outside the 
“Greater EU” countries will have to bear additional costs of about 6.23 USD billion in the same year and scenario. 
This discrepancy is caused by the fact that the predominant number of flights operated under this geopolitical 
reduction scenario is performed by airlines based in one of the “Greater EU” countries while flights from their 
competitors from outside the “Greater EU” – with very few exceptions - are only operated to and from Europe. For 
instance, in this geopolitical scenario about 90% of Lufthansa’s RTKs will be operated under the climate protecting 
measure while United Airlines only has to comply with the climate protecting instrument under consideration for 
18% of its’ RTKs operated. This leads to the conclusion that a competitive disadvantage can be expected for those 
aircraft operators whose country of origin is supporting the respective climate protecting measure and which operate 
flights to and from other world regions. 
 
An analysis of the specific costs (USD/RTK) shows a heterogeneous picture: On the one hand, the specific costs 
implied by the market-based measures are lower for some airlines based in a “Greater EU” or a “Great Aviation 
Country”, as compared to their competitors from outside the respective geopolitical regulation scheme. This is 
especially true for the costs caused by the emission trading scheme for the years 2015-2030. On the other hand, for 
the climate tax a partly opposing trend can be noticed. For instance, the specific costs for the Top 10 FSNC based in 
one of the “Great Aviation Countries” will increase by 0.085 USD per RTK due to the climate tax in the year 2030, 
while the specific costs for the Top 10 FSNC from outside this group of countries only rise by 0.078 USD/RTK. 
 
Apart from the absolute and specific costs, the average specific emissions, i. e. tons CO2 equivalent per 1,000 RTK, 
are a decisive factor for the airlines’ financial burden implied by the market-based measure under consideration. 
Beyond that the percentage of free allocation of emission permits in relation to the required number of permits on 
the airlines’ level is an essential variable for the costs especially caused by the emission trading model. Table 6 
presents the specific emissions und their development in the timeframe investigated as well as the development of 
the percentage of free allocation of emission permits in relation to the required number of permits for the different 
airline groups investigated.  
 
As illustrated by table 6, the specific climate relevant emissions are expected to decrease within the timeframe 2010-
2030. This is the case for all groups of airlines investigated: On average the specific climate relevant emissions will 
decrease from 3.65 t CO2 equivalent per 1,000 RTK in the year 2010 to about 2.93 tons CO2 equivalent/1,000 RTK 
in 2030. Here the influence of autonomous technological efficiency gains on the environmental performance of the 
aviation sector shows. 
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Table 6: Development of the specific emissions (tons CO2 equivalent/1,000 RTK) and of the free allocation of 
emission permits in relation to the required number of permits (in per cent) in the timeframe 2010-2030  
 Specific emissions (t CO2  
equivalent/1000 RTK) 
Percentage of free allocation of emission permits 
Scenario/Group of Airlines 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Top 10 "Greater EU" 
Network Carrier  
3.42 3.44 3.33 3.15 2.83 85 % 67 % 56 % 49 % 45 % 
Top 10 Non-"Greater EU" 
Network Carrier 
3.30 3.25 3.14 2.91 2.69 85 % 64 % 52 % 46 % 40 % 
Top 10 "Greater EU" 
LCC/Holiday Carrier 
3.63 3.55 3.39 3.12 2.88 85 % 71 % 62 % 57 % 53 % 
Top 10 "Great Aviation 
Countries" Network Carrier 
3.74 3.52 3.38 3.11 2.86 85 % 69 % 58 % 51 % 46 % 
Top 10 Non-"Great Aviation 
Countries" Network Carrier 
3.26 3.30 3.22 2.97 2.73 85 % 63 % 50 % 43 % 37 % 
Top 10 "Great Aviation 
Countries" LCC/ Holiday 
Carrier 
4.07 3.94 3.77 3.47 3.26 85 % 71 % 63 % 58 % 54 % 
Top 10 "World" Network 
Carrier 
3.62 3.59 3.45 3.17 2.92 85 % 66 % 55 % 49 % 43 % 
Top 10 "World" LCC/ 
Holiday Carrier 
4.18 4.05 3.87 3.62 3.30 85 % 71 % 63 % 58 % 54 % 
Average 3.65 3.58 3.44 3.19 2.93 85 % 68 % 57 % 51 % 47 % 
Source: AviClim modelling results. In 2012 prices. Results for the metric atr 50. 
 
Not surprisingly, a comparison of the specific climate relevant emissions of the different groups of airlines reveals 
wide differences. Especially those groups of carriers operating very fuel efficient (LCC and Holiday carrier) have 
significantly higher specific climate relevant emissions than other groups of airlines at the beginning of the 
timeframe analyzed. The Top 10 LCC/Holiday carrier based in one of the “Greater EU” countries for instance, emit 
about 3.63 tons CO2 equivalent per 1,000 RTK in the year 2010 while the Top 10 FSNC from one of the “Greater 
EU” countries cause about 3.42 tons CO2 equivalent per 1,000 RTK. These differences can be explained by the 
technologically given “trade-off” between fuel (and thus CO2) optimization of aircraft engines on the one hand side 
and a NOX (and other climate relevant species) optimization of these engines on the other side. Today’s engines can 
technologically be only optimized in one or the other way. By a step-wise introduction of innovative engine 
technology which allows for the reduction of both CO2 and non-CO2 emissions at the same time in the timeframe 
analyzed, the differences between the specific emissions of the LCC/Holiday carriers and the other airline groups 
investigated diminish. In the year 2030 for instance, the Top 10 FSNC based in one of the “Greater EU” countries 
are expected to emit about 2.83 tons CO2 equivalent per 1,000 RTK and the Top 10 LCC/Holiday carrier from one 
of the “Greater EU” countries will cause circa 2.88 tons CO2 equivalent/1,000 RTK. 
 
The percentage of free allocation in relation to the required number of allowances is also an important factor, as 
mentioned above. This is because this percentage determines the number of permits to be purchased by the airlines 
for maintaining their operations. In 2010, this percentage is 85 per cent regardless of the business model of the 
airlines and the geopolitical scenario assumed, due to AviClim’s main assumptions for the emission trading scheme. 
Since the number of permits allocated for free stays constant in the timeframe 2010-2030 and the number of flights 
as well as the climate relevant emissions caused rise in this period, the number of emission permits required by the 
airlines increases. Correspondingly, the percentage of free allocation in relation to the required number of permits 
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decreases. On average, this percentage decreases from 85 per cent in the year 2010 to about 46.8 per cent in 2030. In 
other words: In the year 2030, the airline sector has to purchase emission permits for more than half of it’s climate 
relevant emissions. 
 
An analysis by airline business model reveals some distinctive differences: From 2015 onwards, the Top 10 
LCC/Holiday carrier groups have the highest percentage of free allocation in relation to the required permits, as 
compared to both Top 10 groups of FSNC in the respective scenario. This is the case in all geopolitical reduction 
scenarios investigated. Further remarkable is that the percentage of free allocation of emission permits is always 
higher for FSNC based in a country supporting the market-based measure than the corresponding percentage of the 
competing FSNC from outside the geopolitical reduction scenario. In the year 2020, FSNC based in one of the 
“Great Aviation Countries” will receive free emission permits for about 57.7 per cent of their climate relevant 
emissions in that year, for instance. In contrast, their competitors from outside the “Great Aviation Countries” will 
only get a free allocation of emission permits of about 50.4 per cent in 2020. 
 
These finding can be attributed to two main reasons: Firstly, the growth rates of air traffic in the timeframe 
analyzed. In the medium term these growth rates differ clearly depending on the world region: The European and 
North American air traffic markets are expected to be relatively mature. In contrast for the Asian market noticeable 
growth is forecasted (Airbus, 2013). Accordingly, the absolute amount of climate relevant emissions will develop 
unevenly in the future, depending on the world region. As the airlines serve these world regions differently, this will 
influence their share of free emission permits in relation to the number of required permits. 
 
Secondly, the specific climate relevant emissions (tons CO2 equivalent/1,000 RTK), i. e. the emission characteristics 
of the flights under the emission trading scheme play an important role. The smaller the specific climate relevant 
emissions of the flights, the better for the free allocation rate of permits. AviClim modelling results show that 
especially on long-haul flights the ratio tons CO2 equivalent/flight kilometer is relatively disadvantageous as 
compared to short- and medium-haul flights. This is mainly because NOX emitted on high altitudes (i. e. cruise 
levels) has an increased climate effectiveness (Lee et al. (2010) and Lee et al. (2009)). Consequently, short- and 
medium-haul flights of LCC/Holiday carrier and FSNC as well as feeder and de-feeder flights of FSNC operated 
within the geographical boundaries of the respective geopolitical scenario are treated in favor by their flight length.  
 
According to these findings the rate of free allocation of emission permits will be lower for FSNC from outside the 
geopolitical reduction scenario as compared to their competitors based in a country supporting the emission trading 
scheme. Remarkably, this can be interpreted as a competitive disadvantage for airlines whose country of origin does 
not support climate protecting measures in aviation actively. If this presumably small competitive advantage 
compensates the disadvantage caused by the absolute financial burden of the market-based measure for airlines 
based in a country supporting this measure remains to be seen. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Modelling results indicate that a global emission trading scheme limiting aviation’s full climate impact would be 
advantageous to minimize airlines’ costs as compared to a climate tax. At the same time, competitive distortions can 
be avoided. If a global emission trading scheme for aviation turns out to be not agreeable, the second best approach 
would be an implementation in the “Great Aviation Countries”. This is because the delta between both reduction 
schemes is less than 10 per cent of the global flights. 
 
An analysis for different groups of airlines reveals that in absolute numbers the highest cost impact can be expected 
for airlines based in one of the countries supporting the respective climate protecting measure. This leads to the 
conclusion that a competitive disadvantage can be expected for those aircraft operators whose country of origin is 
supporting the respective climate protecting measure and which operate flights to and from other world regions. 
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An in depth-analysis of the specific emissions and the rate of free allocation of permits shows that the world regions 
served by the airlines under consideration as well as the length and the emission characteristics of the flights are 
important factors for the economic impacts of the market-based measures. Also the airline business model is a 
distinctive determinant for the costs and competitive effects. LCC and Holiday carrier are treated in favor by the 
emission trading scheme on short and medium-haul flights. FSNC based in a country supporting the respective 
market-based measure will gain a competitive advantage as compared to their competitors from outside the 
geopolitical reduction scenario. This is because the share of free allocation of emission permits will always be lower 
for the latter. This is remarkable since these results for the limitation of aviation’s full climate impact are contrary to 
the respective findings for an emission trading scheme for the limitation of CO2 alone (see Scheelhaase et al. (2010), 
for instance). If this presumably small competitive advantage compensates the disadvantage caused by the absolute 
financial burden of the market-based measure for airlines based in a country supporting this measure remains to be 
seen. All in all, the best option would be the implementation of the market-based measure on a global level. 
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